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Abstract: This paper develops an account of the normative basis of priority setting
in health care as combining the values which a given society holds for the
common good of its members, with the universal provided by a principle of
common humanity. We discuss national differences in health basket in Europe
and argue that health care decision-making in complex social and moral
frameworks is best thought of as anchored in such a principle by drawing on the
philosophy of need. We show that health care needs are ethically ‘thick’ needs
whose psychological and social construction can best be understood in terms of
David Wiggins’s notion of vital need: a person’s need is vital when failure to meet
it leads to their harm and suffering. The moral dimension of priority setting which
operates across different societies’ health care systems is located in the demands
both of and on any society to avoid harm to its members.
1. Introduction
Recent cuts in health budgets mean that priority setting has become an
increasingly important objective of health care policy. Yet attempts to rationalise
budget allocations through cost benefit analysis have proved problematic. This is
because the efficiency of standardised measures such as QALYs (quality-adjusted
life years) depends on their capacity to neutralise ethical considerations by
ignoring the differences between individuals and hence to remain indifferent
between potential priority criteria. Moreover, unlike other areas of public
expenditure, health care policy gives pride of place to considerations of equity at
the expense of cost considerations (McKie and Richardson, 2000; Peacock et al.,
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2009; Robinson, 1999; Sassi, 2003). Researchers have therefore begun to search
for measures that reconcile efficiency and fairness by including ‘equity weights’ in
the metrics that are used to calculate QALYs (Lancsar et al., 2011; Nord et al.,
1999). At the same time, the public authorities, notably the Haute Autorite´
de Sante´ (HAS) in France, and the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) in the UK, have sought to legitimate rationing measures by
making them include judgements of social value.
These developments cannot, however, circumvent the need to reflect onwhich
criteria should be privileged when setting priorities within health care systems.
Since the theoretical debate has not generated a definitive conception of equity,
a significant empirical literature has developed which assumes that the answer
to this theoretical impasse lies with the general public. The point turns on what
is understood as the general public. Traditionally, the general public has been
equatedwith the aggregate of its members and its preferences have beenmeasured
as aggregated individual utilities. More recently Paul Menzel has argued for a
conception of societal values, which combines individual subjective utilities with
interpersonal utilitarian trade-offs (Menzel, 1999).
Such empirical ethics must, however, overcome a number of problems
associated with the status of the preference data that it collects. Taking
people’s opinions seriously may lead to discrimination against particular
groups; significantly different utilities may be attached to the same health
states by patients and by representatives of the public; patient utilities may
reflect adaptation to their condition – the so-called ‘happy slave’ phenomenon
(Menzel, 1999). In order to avoid a ‘dictatorship of the uninformed’,
empirical ethics must consider the right sort of preferences for priority
setting when respondents vote for one alternative over another (Olsen et al.,
2003).
One solution would be to restrict the ground for such debate by questioning
the public about familiar rationing strategies. Discussion in the literature has
concentrated on particular criteria, and notably on the comparison between the
severity of illness (which is generally adopted by state health services) and the
notion of ‘fair innings’ (Williams, 1997) which takes account of past health care
consumption in order to reduce differences in lifetime experience of health or
focus to poor lifetime health prospects. The first criterion generally serves the
interests of the elderly, whilst the second privileges younger segments of the
population. The literature is divided on which of these two criteria is perceived
to be the most legitimate; some studies endorse the notion of fair innings, whilst
others suggest that the severity of illness is a superior criterion (Dolan and
Tsuchiya, 2005; Shah, 2009; Stolk et al., 2005). These results suggest that social
preferences as regards health care are unstable. They are also interdependent
in that the opinions of others (notably medical professionals) are relevant to
preference formation (Green, 2009; Wiseman et al., 2003). This means that
measuring and aggregating individual preferences must be supplemented by the
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construction of mechanisms that make space for public deliberation on the topic
of priority setting (Masse´, 2005).
One way to attempt this is to examine how the values of a society, which
we shall refer to as societal values, confer legitimacy in priority setting debates.1
We recognise that the health care-related dimensions of a society’s values are
neither universal nor stable over time since health is understood differently in
different communities and in different historical contexts. We will therefore
take the analysis of priority setting in a new direction by treating it as the
shared expression of societal values with both local and universal content. Our
framework employs the notion of vital needs from moral philosophy in order to
locate the ethical dimension of societal values relevant to health care decisions
in a principle of common humanity. The recognition of such a principle entails
that society must protect its members from harm and suffering.
By drawing on the evidence relating to the construction of the European
health basket, Part 2 of the paper shows how existing priority-setting criteria
reflect three identifiable perspectives (Hasman et al., 2006). None of these
three dominates, so policy makers are obliged to combine and transform them
when deciding which criteria to adopt. The construction of health baskets
is not, therefore, the straightforward implementation of a set of well-known
rules or principles, but rather an assemblage of (often conflicting) values. In
Part 3, we draw on institutionalist approaches (Davis, 2001; Hodgson, 2008,
2009; McIntyre and Mooney 2007; Mooney, 1998, 2005, 2010) to provide
a theoretical elaboration of this assembly process and relate it to the idea of
health care need. In Part 4 we complete our analysis by linking health care needs
to the idea of vital need within moral philosophy (Wiggins, 1987). The moral
realism in Wiggins’s approach provides for an objective treatment of values
and their prioritisation which is independent of both elitist, and also medical,
paternalism.
2. The construction of priorities in health care
Are priorities arbitrary? Evidence from the European health basket
The public debate about priority setting in health care is usually carried out
by nationally based commissions that produce reports emphasizing one or
other abstract principle or developing empirically based normative guidelines
(Ham, 1997; Sabik and Lie, 2008). The European HealthBASKET programme
offers a tool to identify these core values. In developing an inventory of health
care services provided by public funds in Europe, this programme provides an
empirical base for comparing different member states.
1 We are not here referring to Menzel’s operationalised ‘societal value’, but rather to the shared ethical
standards that lie behind this.
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This comparative study2 emphasises the similarities between states: most
countries exclude plastic surgery, travel medicine and non-conventional
treatments such as acupuncture from the list of state supplied health care services
(Schreyogg et al., 2005).
Despite significant differences in the institutional structure and organisation
of national health services, variations in the services provided appear to be fairly
minor. This observation, however, is only valid if we consider a very broad
conception of service provision which focuses on the so-called ‘depth’ of the
health basket. If we focus instead on the ‘height’ of the basket – the proportion
of the cost of goods and services charged to or reimbursed by the state or public
institutions – the story is somewhat different. The depth criterion enumerates any
good or service which is subject to some form of reimbursement and therefore
not exclusively paid for by the patient. The height criterion takes into account
the cost for the patient and the co-payment amount, introducing a monetary
dimension. Thus, health baskets with the same depth can have very different
heights.
Applying the height criterion, we can see that there are differences between
European countries, though some groups such as children, adolescents, pregnant
women and people in need of hospital treatment, benefit from high coverage
everywhere. Some groups are prioritised over others through differential
reimbursement or state financing for either all or some of the care that they
receive. For example, France has, historically, accorded priority to the most
seriously ill, the costs of whose care are entirely met. Since 2000, the poorest
have also received total cover.3 A recent proposal aims to abolish this level of
cover for the seriously ill group, replacing it with a threshold of health spending
defined in absolute terms or as a percentage of income.
Observation of health care baskets in Europe, in respect of both depth
and height, shows that the same treatment can be financed very differently
depending on the type of patient concerned. Health services all over Europe
have created, developed or activated prioritisation policies designed to privilege
certain patient groups by protecting them from excessive financial outlays. This
form of prioritisation has intensified with the introduction of market reforms
designed to reduce expenditure (Saltman, 2002;Wynand and Van de Ven, 1996).
Though health provision has always been targeted at certain groups, the erosion
2 The ‘health benefits and service costs in Europe – HealthBASKET’ project, funded by the European
Commission from 2004 to 2007 has developed an inventory of complementary European health care
services in order to alleviate the problems posed by the increasing number of patients who cross national
borders for treatment. The ambition of this new European classification system is to delineate the services
that are supplied by publicly funded health services (the so-called health basket) in nine EU member states
(Denmark, Great Britain, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain). The
programme focuses on three dimensions of coverage: population coverage (breadth), service coverage
(depth) and cost coverage (height) (Busse et al., 2008; The European Journal of Health Economics, 2005).
3 Excluding however those that are not citizens or legal residents.
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of solidarity has forced governments to justify current prioritisation policies and
develop new ones.
The replacement of universal social protection policies with targeted ones has
not led to a focus on one target group. Different groups such as the poor, the
elderly or those with the most severe illnesses have been targeted in different
circumstances. This variety in prioritisation mechanisms suggests that there are
several different, yet potentially legitimate, conceptions of state health coverage
at play in European health systems.
It is tempting to consider any explanation that relies on such historico-political
factors to be arbitrary and thus devoid of any underlying economic logic or
justification. On the one hand, economic enquiry has suggested that the medical
profession plays a role in the creation of clinical needs (Cookson and Dolan,
2005). Such clinical need is attributable to differences between doctors and
patients in their knowledge of and attitudes towards medicine. According to
economic theory, asymmetries of information can produce an artificial clinical
demandwhich is not justified by the patient’s health status (Evans, 1974; Leonard
et al., 2009). Technological innovation can also be exploited by the medical
profession in order to promote profitable treatments that lack efficacy. On
the other hand, medical innovations, especially in surgery, can provide new
treatments which do become publicly funded (Korica and Molloy, 2010). One
example is cataract surgery, now regularly offered to the elderly and which
imposes a financial burden on the state. Technological innovation and its
utilisation by the medical profession play a more important part in the increase in
health expenditure than ageing itself and also contribute significantly to longevity
and to quality of life (Dormont et al., 2006). Notwithstanding the existence of
corporatist interests or political lobbying, clinical need does not inevitably lead
to overutilisation. The measures that contribute to the height of the health basket
may appear arbitrary to some economists, but they are not in the eyes of the
populations that support them.
It is difficult to provide an economic rationale for the criteria upon which
prioritisation is built because they are unrelated to questions of efficiency.
Targeted solidarity is not justified in instrumental terms: priorities are chosen
and defended independently of their contribution to overall social welfare.
Rather than contributing to welfare, priority-setting criteria are amongst the
measures that help to define it. This may be seen from the fact that prioritisation
policies attempt to distinguish essential from secondary concerns within the
health system. They do not, therefore, assume the sort of indifference that
would normally be associated with arbitrariness. Instead, prioritisation draws
on implicit hierarchies of social and medical values that are rooted in the history
of different national systems of social protection.
Priority setting in health policy draws on the moral aspects of solidarity
that are endemic to European culture (Maarse and Paulus, 2003). This social
dimension would lead us to expect different health systems to share fundamental
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normative commitments, though it remains to be seen how these commitments
inform concrete policy measures.
The justification of priorities and the normativity of health systems
The justification of prioritisation in coverage and access to health services
thus frequently rests on implicit moral ideals embedded in an equally implicit
conception of a common good for society and its members. The latter is
susceptible to multiple potential definitions, but can be generally understood
as that resource or set of resources to which all human beings must have access
to live with dignity in their community.4 By citing measures currently in use in
Europe we aim to show that their priorities do reflect citizens’ sense of justice
about health care; in these attempts to define priorities, health policy is translating
moral ideals in general currency, into institutional mechanisms.
Another approach to charting such values draws on a descriptive typology of
health care need. Hasman et al. (2006) argue that three different principles,
commonly used to underpin various institutional configurations of targeted
solidarity, can be employed as criteria of three conceptions of health care need.
These are: (1) the criterion of the poor initial state, premised among other things
on the human desire to extend life, to have a life worth living, to end one’s life
well; these sorts of considerations justify allocating resources ‘regardless of life
expectancy after treatment’. (2) The criterion of minimum normal functioning
range, based on the argument that normal functioning is necessary for social
participation, which justifies targeting the poorest for whompoor health can limit
participation in a normal social andwork life. (3) The criterion of significant gain,
where ‘gain’ denotes measurability of improvement in health states. Here, need
prioritisation can only be justified for needsmeeting the criterion of demonstrable
improvement according to some measure of significance.
This typology has limited analytical utility since it is largely descriptive of
existing practices. It proposes three principles each with a different normative
basis for the assessment of health care need. However, it does not interrogate
or analyse the underlying structure of these complex social norms. This leaves
unexplored the question of how the typology is to be grounded in the different
moral conceptions of what is good for human beings on the one hand, and
political concepts of rights, equality and justice on the other.
The key underlying issue for any needs-based typology is the interrelation of
the biological and moral dimensions implicit in concepts such as ‘poor initial
state’ and ‘normal functioning’. As stated, the first two principles do not show a
basis for identifying these moral and biological dimensions. They are therefore
principally of use in picking out working social conceptions of health care need
4 The idea of a common good itself is too non-specific to ground priority setting. Consequently, we
do not use it in our argument (in Part 4) for making the normativity of need the basis for the values
informing health care decisions.
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in which the normative content is fixed by some inchoate mixture of moral and
political notions. The third principle of significant gain is somewhat different.
It brings health care needs under a cardinal scale through the biologically based
notion of gain, whilst locating the moral dimension in the notion of significance.
However, Hasman et al. define the latter as ‘capacity to benefit’, which is, again,
a mere placeholder for the same inchoate mixture of moral and political notions.
Nevertheless, despite its analytical limitations and its inability to provide a
universal criterion for what is to count as a health care need, the typology
does have empirical utility. The three principles, deployed in different ways, can
be found at work in the measures that fix the height of the health basket in
European countries.
Those in the poorest health (the first criterion) are prioritised to varying
degrees in different European countries. The criterion of the poor initial state
is, for instance, only implicitly adopted in the UK and Italy where accident and
emergency units provide the method for bypassing hospital waiting lists. It is
more explicit in France, where patients suffering from30 listed conditions are free
from paying the usual charges in the form of the ‘ticket moderateur’. In Germany
and Belgium, long-term care is regulated in such a way as to guarantee a strict
upper limit on patient spending. Holland, which uses a system of competitive
insurance, excludes serious conditions such as chronic illness and disability from
the insurance system and provides state coverage for them, Finally, Switzerland
has put in place special measures to protect those affected by genetic conditions.
The second criterion, normal functioning range, is translated into policy in
most European countries by measures intended to limit individual spending
on health. However, above a certain threshold of health spending (defined in
absolute terms or as a percentage of income), requirements for co-payment can
lead to treatment being relinquished for financial reasons, which can in turnmake
it impossible to achieve the minimum level of health necessary for normal partici-
pation in social life (‘normal functioning’). The generalised limit on spendingmay
be linked to measures aimed at the poorest members of society. Belgium has put
in place a supplementary payment in addition to reimbursement for beneficiaries
of so-called ‘intervention majore´e’. This is distributed according to income,
disability or dependence criteria. In Holland, the spending cap is fixed by the level
of excess paid by insured patients, which is alleviated by fiscal compensation to
correct for the poorest. France has not adopted spending caps, leaving patients
at risk of financial ruin, though the state has instituted free universal cover for
the poorest members of society since 2000. In the UK, the social criterion is less
visible because it is directly integrated into the funding mechanism that links the
department of health to the 151 National Health Service (NHS) primary care
trusts. Their access to resources is determined by an index that includes informa-
tion on age, sex, geographic location and a range of socio-economic indicators.
The final criterion, significant gain, is much more uniformly deployed in
European health systems. Coverage of expenditure on medication that has been
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authorised for market is affected by its measured therapeutic value. The
proportion of the cost borne by the state varies between drugs that are considered
to be vital andwhich are provided for free, to other products that provide comfort
without medical benefit and whose cost may be paid in full by the patient. Oth-
erwise, patient reimbursement can be tied to the price of a generic substitute. The
criterion of significant gain plays a crucial role in the lists of products issued by
national agencies such as HAS in France or NICE in the UK. The lists delimiting
state coverage are usually positive, but can be negative as in Germany and the
UK. In the latter case, NHS doctors are prevented from prescribing drugs that are
blacklisted and can only prescribe grey-listed drugs to certain patients. This crite-
rion is discernible in the guidelines and rules of best practice associated with the
rise of evidence-based medicine.5 This conception privileges scientific measure-
ment over clinical experience in the proof of therapeutic efficacy, and takes the
biomedical paradigm and statistical analysis as the basis for priority setting. De-
spite developments in statistical techniques and attempts to objectify it, the crite-
rion of significant gain remains anchored in the socio-political contexts in which
it is applied. For example, empirical studies on treatments for obesity and tobacco
addiction show that coverage varies significantly between countries: the UKoffers
full coverage, but France and Germany do not (Nguyen-Kim et al., 2005).
Our analysis shows that there are no universally accepted criteria for estab-
lishing priorities, and that the different systems of health care provision retain
their own identities. Nevertheless, the measures taken are not arbitrary since
prioritising must have some objective and generally recognised basis. Priority-
orderingmust therefore meet two conditions: first, priorities must be community-
based, and reflect a conception of the common good, and second there must be an
objectivity guaranteeing that this conception is not localised to one community.
We propose to bring together these two apparently conflicting requirements.
3. Prioritisation and the stabilisation of value
Societal values and the community
Empirical studies demonstrating that the depth of the health basket is
relatively consistent across European countries tend to reinforce this mainstream
analysis by confirming that there is widespread agreement on what constitute
‘essential’ services. However, our discussion indicates that different, perhaps
incommensurable, principles determine the (equally important) height of the
health basket. Though these principles cannot be simply derived from underlying
moral and political notions, their diversity indicates that the traditional exclusive
5 Evidence-basedmedicine was born in the department of clinical epidemiology atMcMaster University
in Canada, in the 1970s. Although challenged by those practitioners for whom illness and treatment are
not measurable, it owes its success to the demand of public authorities for quantification and therapeutic
efficacy.
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emphasis on economic efficiency is misplaced. The view that societal values are
distortions that hamper the smooth functioning of health care markets does not
do justice to the way that priority setting, as we have earlier noted, draws on
a conception of the common good for a society, if only as the bald fact that
economic calculation presupposes some such definition of the common good.6
The typology of Hasman et al. (discussed in Part 2) offers a way to identify
relevant societal values in the form of the three principles underpinning the
criterion of the poor initial state, the criterion of minimum normal functioning
range and the criterion of significant gain. Each principle gives primacy to a
different aspect of human social and biological functioning, and each criterion
finds application in some circumstances; but none dominates to the exclusion of
the others. This diversity suggests that there are several ways that communities
might choose to assess individual and group claims on the health system.
However, in the absence of a meta-criterion to adjudicate between these different
principles, the social sciences cannot provide guidance on which one to adopt.
This means that choice of criterion inevitably defaults to a local decision. Indeed,
some authors have suggested that there is a strong case for locating the ultimate
source of prioritisation policies in the community. This idea is taken forward by
institutionalists who advocate a move beyond the current dichotomy between
welfarism and extra welfarism in health economics (Hodgson, 2009; Mooney,
2001, 2009, 2010).
The idea that priority setting in health is a reflection of communal conceptions
of the common good is central to Gavin Mooney’s new ‘communitarian claims’
research programme. A central element of his critique of standard approaches
is the insistence that the definition of ‘good’ health cannot be derived from
either subjective utilities, or objective measures such as QALYs. According to
Mooney, this is because, ‘Our abilities to manage to desire good health and in
turn our ability to judge what constitutes good health are functions of community
expectations with respect to both individual health and community health’.
(Mooney, 2010: 137). Mooney builds on well-known critiques of rational choice
theory such as Sen’s (1991) analysis of adaptive preferences, which suggests that
individuals may not have the resources to imagine or expect a ‘better’ health
state as defined by some objective measure and consequently that subjective
preferences cannot be seen as proxies for health care need. However, universal
measures of individual and community health can also be problematic and
undesirable. In order to support this claim Mooney draws on what he calls
6 This view finds its classical expression in Amartya Sen’s well-known critique of standard rational
choice theory (Sen, 1977). Sen shows that traditional approaches to rational decision-making cannot
account for our common sense notion of commitment, including themoral or cultural norms that underpin
all economic activity. His favourite example is the case of truthfulness in communication: we may adopt
a commitment to be truthful in all of our social interactions even though we are aware that being truthful
will occasionally diminish our ability to satisfy our personal desires. Sen argues that communal life
(including economic activity) presupposes the existence of such basic commitments.
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the ‘normative interpretation’ of communitarian political philosophy, which
emphasises the non-instrumental nature of our commitments to the communities
that we live in (Mooney, 2010: 126–127). According to Mooney, membership in
a community justifies special obligations in the realm of health care on grounds of
solidarity and because of the fundamental contribution that good health makes
to human well-being. These obligations are non-negotiable and constitutive of
what it means to be a citizen.
Here, Mooney faces the familiar objection made against other communitarian
approaches that his term ‘community’ is underspecified: it could refer to all the
citizens of a supranational organisation, a nation state, a province or members
of a particular ethnic, cultural or socio-economic group. Mooney clearly does
not regard this inherent vagueness in the notion of community membership to
be problematic for his approach to health economics. His pragmatic response
is that, in the context of health care policy at least, ‘community’ tends to
be defined geographically since health care systems are usually administered
at the national or provincial level (Mooney, 2010: 125).7 Accordingly, the
key to settling questions of overlapping membership of communities lies in
identifying both the legal and informal conceptions of citizenship that individuals
subscribe to; a member of a community, in Mooney’s sense, is above all a citizen
with specified rights, duties and expectations (Mooney, 2010: 126). This dual
reliance on a geographical conception of community combined with an emphasis
on citizenship provides Mooney with the tools for determining community
membership on a case-by-case basis.
Current health policy is rule based and focussed on standards such as QALY
league tables; it puts exclusive emphasis on health outcomes as measured against
a predetermined maximand and ignores citizens’ sense of justice in health care.
This perceived weakness leads Mooney to propose the direct involvement of the
community in setting the objectives and methods of health care systems through
a political agreement or constitution enshrining the rights, claims and priorities
associated with health care provision (Mooney, 2010: 153–158). According to
Mooney, such a constitutional mechanism challenges the dominant rule-based
approach because, ‘. . . benefit maximisation or health maximisation says nothing
about who gets the benefits or whose health is improved. . . The new paradigm
involves the notion of a third party, in this case the community, determining
what claims are and their relative strengths’ (Mooney, 2010: 159). Moreover, he
stresses that democratic mechanisms will most probably not be used to resolve
policy issues directly through public votes on specific questions. The intention,
rather, is to seek public endorsement for the procedural bases upon which health
care institutions act and according to which their action is subsequently justified
(Mooney, 2010: 108–111). Such democratic endorsement of the basic normative
7 Though he mentions the Aboriginal Medical Services in Australia as an example of a rare ethnically
based communal health service.
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foundations of health institutions can be linked toMooney’s notion of citizenship
as described above.
It is germane to our argument that the recognition of the implicit normative
content in health economics has not led Mooney down the path of searching
for universal moral principles upon which to found health systems. There is
understandable resistance to the idea that we should seek out universal rules to
guide our thinking about health care. The emphasis, rather, is on what social
actors deem to be legitimate within their communities and the task of the social
scientist is descriptive rather than prescriptive.
At this stage, we might ask whether an appeal to community preferences as
the basis of priority setting in health care can be sustained in the absence of
some underlying moral commitments? Though Mooney stops short of explicitly
enunciating universal principles, he does decisively reject full-blown relativism
and makes implicit appeal to such commitments. In this rejection of relativism he
refuses to endorse the view that any set of community preferences automatically
embodies a legitimate conception of the common good. Indeed, he recognises that
the adoption of a constitutional mechanism does not rule out the possibility that
a whole community could be ‘wicked’. Mooney further admits that procedures
cannot alleviate the problem of a wicked community. In the final analysis, a com-
munity’s health care choices must be judged against a universal principle (or set
of principles), whose content is left unspecified (Mooney, 2010: 137). A way to
conceptualise these universal principles has been suggested by other institution-
alists such as McMaster (2007) and Hodgson (2008, 2009), who have called for
the integration of some non-utilitarian conception of need into health economics.
The reintroduction of need
In Hodgson’s work the ‘need for health’ is grounded in notions of physical,
psychological and socially induced suffering, in a way that our desires or
preferences are not (Hodgson, 2008: 241). Health needs have two salient
characteristics: they tend to be non-voluntary and unevenly distributed. Many
illnesses, injuries or accidents that create health needs are unpredictable and
independent of the choices or responsibilities of those who suffer them. In
addition, needs are highly varied and idiosyncratic; the incidence of health
problems does not affect everyone equally and remedies may vary (Hodgson,
2008 243–245). The heterogeneity and uncertainty surrounding the framing
of health needs more generally is replicated in the case of the need for health
care, which is the more pressing concern for health economists, according to
Hodgson. He recognises both the dynamics of changing health care needs due to
demographic, technological and environmental factors and the complexity and
diversity of the institutional frameworks that could potentially be adopted to
cope with them.8
8 In doing so, he echoes other critical contributions to the health economics literature that see
themselves as consistent with the institutionalist tradition but do not invoke an objectivist conception
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However, the two parts of Hodgson’s argument – the provisional
institutionalist analysis and the advocacy of the concept of need – are independent
of each other. He does not connect the recognition of the objective basis of health
care needs to a specific normative basis for institutional design. In other words,
Hodgson’s recognition of health care needs does not lead him to propose a
hierarchy of essential services, nor a mechanism for determining what such a
hierarchy might look like; the distinction between need and preference, resting
principally on moral intuitions, remains schematic.
Our discussion has already noted the complex framework of unarticulated
moral and political concepts underpinning existing typologies of need such
as that of Hasman et al. In what follows, we propose to clarify this picture
by drawing on the philosophy of need. We propose a new direction for the
institutionalist programme in which need for health care can provide the moral
foundations for the provision of health care in general, and prioritisation in
particular.
One might already think that any claim on the health services is legitimated
by the needs of the claimant (relative to the needs of others) and therefore that
need forms the moral basis of all such claims. This is not a new idea in health
economics; it is implicit in much of the work of extra welfarists and premised on
the observation that need and desire do not always coincide (Brouwer et al.,
2008). However, the tendency to focus on epidemiologically defined health
outcomes has tended to reduce the concept of need employed in health economics
to what Mooney calls ‘simple need’. Simple need is measured solely in medical
or biological terms by assessing the extent of the health problem or the capacity
to benefit from treatment, and assumes that health gains should be weighted
equally, irrespective of who is benefiting from them. This definition of need
makes no place for the social components of health and is consequently (in our
opinion correctly) rejected by institutionalists.
One obvious alternative would be to adopt a social definition of needs and
see them as entirely constructed towards socially defined goals, with no more
than a contingent relation to simple need. This view would conceptualise health
needs in the same way as needs for transport or leisure. The latter position
is superficially consistent with Mooney’s approach in that it would allow
community preferences to determine need entirely. But this view of needs, even if
intelligible for use in policies elsewhere in the social spectrum, is open to serious
objections when applied in the domain of health care. Determining who to treat
and how to treat them on the basis of such socially constructed needs detaches
of need (Jan, 1998; McMaster, 2002). The emphasis, in Hodgson’s work as well as that of other
institutionalists, is on understanding health care within an evolutionary framework. Due to limitations
of space, we are unable to address this question directly in the remainder of this article. However, we do
not see any necessary conflict between the conception of need proposed in Part 4 and the evolutionary
framework defended by Hodgson and other institutionalists.
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decision-making from ethics by yoking it to social contingency. Moreover,
the constructivist position equates health needs with aggregated subjective
assessments of utility and therefore runs the risk of committing the welfarist
error at the community level. This is because nothing ensures that such collective
assessments of health status are any more valid from a medical standpoint than
individual ones. Furthermore, if one were fully to adopt the communitarian
perspective, one would be unable to make comparative assessments of different
health systems. As we have already seen in Part 3, this is clearly not the intention
behind current institutionalist approaches.
In summary, institutionalists argue that the prioritisation of resources in health
care should respond to objective, medical-biological needs, not to the subjective
utilities of individuals. At the same time the normativity of need statements in
the domain of health care must reflect societal values; this carries the risk of re-
introducing utilities as aggregated individual preferences. We encounter here the
instability inherent in discussions of human need. On the one hand, a concept of
universal, medical-biological need will fail to take account of individuals’ values
and life projects. On the other hand, a wholly socially constructed concept of
need, one constructed out of the contingent preferences of individuals, has lost
any claim to universality.
4. Societal values and vital needs
‘Thick’ health care need and vital needs
We have seen that the recognition of health needs presents a promising source of
a non-arbitrary moral justification for the delivery of health care in a situation
where resources are limited. Yet notions of need that are reduced to the
medical-biological determinants of health and emptied of their social content
cannot hope to resolve the problems associated with priority setting. Similarly,
in constructivist notions that define need in terms of the preferences of the
majority, the threat of relativism arises. In order to base priority setting on
firmer foundations a more sophisticated ‘thick’ conception of need is required,
one that incorporates both universal and socially contextualised elements. Health
care needs must be structured Janus-faced: looking towards their communitarian
context and at the same time connecting this to general human concerns. The
task of this section is to show how health care needs, while based on a central
core of objective truth about human beings as biological and social creatures, are
at the same time ethically thick in having different value expressions according
to social context. For this we turn to David Wiggins’s concept of vital need
(Wiggins, 1987).
As Batifoulier et al. (2009) note, Wiggins is unsatisfied with the reduction
of need to preference because of two characteristics of needs: their objective
dimension, and their necessity based on the claims of an individual to avoid
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suffering. In what follows we argue that health care needs are to be seen as a
subgroup of vital needs.
Although much has been written about the concept of need and about its
relation to health care (Culyer, 1995, Hurley, 2000), we draw here on Wiggins’s
concept of vital need for several reasons. First, it is analytically rigorous. As
already noted, he carefully distinguishes need from want or preference. He also
distinguishes absolute need as the ethically relevant form under discussion, from
needs that are instrumental in realising contingent human goals and projects
(Wiggins, 1987: 6–10). Secondly, he links vital need (through harm) to suffering,
which extends the scope of the account to (what philosophers call) individual
moral psychology (see e.g. Wiggins, 1987: 11, 14). Thirdly, his conception of
need is non-Hegelian and non-Marxian (Wiggins, 1987: 2–3). An important
consequence of this is that the way that needs are given contextual shape by a
community is not conceived of as dialectical.9 Instead, Wiggins sees needs (and
the rights that they engender) as being integral to the implicit moral consensus
or ‘system of social morality’ that all societies must possess. They are discovered
a posteriori when individuals question the circumstances under which the non-
fulfilment of a need would constitute grounds for reconsidering their adherence
to the society in question.10 As a proposed mechanism of need-construction
this is more realistic than an abstract dialectical model, and consequently, as
we note in our conclusion, more accessible to empirical investigation. It also
provides compatibility between the psychology of individual subjects and their
social being. Fourthly, and last, through its definitional criterion of suffering
harm Wiggins’s account draws together the three levels of human experience
as classically defended by the moral philosopher Bernard Williams (1995: 185–
186). Williams has argued that judgements in terms of thick ethical concepts
draw their evaluative significance from the social level of shared practice, the
psychological level of individual attitudes and feelings and the objective level of
facts such as the human capacity for suffering.11
Wiggins defines a vital need as one which must be met if the individual is
to avoid suffering harm.12 The notion of harm is directly normative, being
an impairment to human functioning and well-being.13 Suffering, in addition
to the descriptive sense of ‘undergoing’ something, is also normative. Wiggins
links it directly with wretchedness (Wiggins, 1987: 11), which brings out the
psychological dimension of undergoing harm and its consequences. Vital need
is thus seen to be a thick ethical concept incorporating social and psychological
9 See, in contrast, Hamilton (2003) for a recent dialectical account.
10 For a fuller account of this complex claim see Wiggins (1987: 32–36).
11 These objective facts are what Wiggins calls the ‘invariant’ aspects of human nature. Our reading
of Williams here draws also on ‘The truth in relativism’ and other writings in Williams (1981, 1995), as
well as Williams (1973).
12 Connecting the idea of suffering with health care need is also suggested by Hodgson (2009).
13 Understood in Wiggins’s philosophy as the Aristotelian notion of ‘human flourishing’.
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values. It also incorporates norms of human functioning. Vital needs have as
their basic core what is demanded by invariant facts about human nature,
the ‘laws of nature and invariable environmental facts, or facts about human
constitution’ (Wiggins, 1987: 16). But needs are also basic when they arise from
what is invariant about humans as subjects. Need claims have both social and
psychological normative force, as we have seen, but this normativity has itself
an objective basis in the human condition; harm to human beings is harm to
a species of creatures with minds and bodies, capable of psychological and
physical suffering. These facts ground the normative principle that harm to and
the suffering of members of the species should be limited: it registers something
which is ‘non-negotiable in the various ideals about human harm and flourishing
that conditions our sense of the socially (humanly) possible’ (Wiggins, 1987: 16).
Vital need and ‘common humanity’
The reference point for the construction of vital needs remains the facts,
biological, psychological and social of our common humanity as described by
Bernard Williams (1973: 232): ‘those who belong to the species homo sapiens
. . . [all] have the capacity to feel pain, both from physical causes and from
situations represented in perception and in thought; and the capacity to feel
affection for others’. This conception of common humanity connects need with
moral psychology. It grounds a strong claim on the part of theorists such as
Wiggins and Williams that reference to common humanity involves more than a
methodological principle; it introduces a conception of what is ‘non-negotiable’.
The normativity of vital need takes account of both the individual subjective
meaning of harm and suffering, and its intersubjective meaning. It thus respects
the connection between the significance of suffering for an individual and the
morality of their society, made explicit by its societal values.
Vital need then provides the bridge to the thick concept of health care need.
As a thick concept, health care needs incorporate values at all three levels:
the objective, the psychological and the social.14 By categorising health care
needs as vital needs, it becomes plain that health care needs, while being basic
as defined above, are not coextensive with needs for biological survival. Nor
are they merely socially constructed. As a subgroup of vital needs to be met
if harm and suffering are to be avoided, they are needs of human beings for
their well-being as individuals in society. It is not our intention here to propose
our own definition of well-being, or of harm, but to suggest that if a definition
is to be anything other than ad hoc it will have to include two aspects we
14 As an example, the need for plastic surgery: here the harm to the individual of an uncorrected
deformity can be assessed with reference to all three levels: objective functional impairment (hare lip less
than cleft palate); however the subjective psychological impact of a deformity and social attitudes to it do
not simply mirror functional impairment. Both the psychological suffering and (in the case of childhood
deformities) the effects on education and cognitive achievement must be independently assessed. So, too,
must social evaluation of the deformity and its disabling consequences.
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find in Wiggins’s analysis. First, a clear statement of the ‘non-negotiable’ core
conception of human well-being. This should refer to societal values, values
embedded in our society, but it should also make explicit what is, and what is
not, morally and psychologically envisageable for us under the richer conception
of a common humanity sketched out here. And secondly, there should be a clear
view of the ways in which the meanings of harm and suffering are understood
by the different communities under consideration.
In Part 2 we referred to the typology of Hasman et al. (2006), derived from
a survey of existing practices. Its three principles or criteria each reflected a
different normative emphasis in the assessment of health care need. However, it
remained to identify and articulate the social norms underlying these principles.
We argued that a needs-based typology must integrate the biological and
moral dimensions underlying concepts such as ‘poor initial state’ and ‘normal
functioning’, the bases of the first and second principles Hasman et al. identify.
The third principle, of significant gain, brings together a biologically based notion
of ‘gain’ and an evaluative notion of significance as ‘capacity to benefit’.
Armed with Wiggins’s analysis of vital need, and proposing that health care
needs should be placed in this category, we may now return to the Hasman
typology to propose that part at least of its normative basis is supplied by the
notion of harm. Wiggins’s analysis of need ties directly to the avoidance of harm:
accordingly the need for an ‘intervention’ (using Hasman et al.’s term) is a vital
health care need if without it the individual will suffer harm.
Hasman et al.’s three principles all imply a reference to the notion of harm. The
poor initial state and normal functioning criteria do so through the implicit claim
that biological impairment is inevitably harmful to an individual’s psychological
and social well-being; the relation of need and harm here is in the reduction of
present harm.15 The principle of significant gain invokes an explicitly evaluative
notion, the ‘capacity to benefit’, while however locating its evaluative dimension
in the quantitative valuation of ‘health state forms’ using, again, biological and
functional parameters. While such a quantitative, ‘objectifying’ approach might
be thought to remove the need even for oblique references to human well-being,
extending the analysis of need as the reduction of harm to this third principle not
only preserves the richer interpretation of health care need, but also provides the
basis on which benefit as the reduction of harm can be measured. Drawing on
Wiggins’s account of the dimensions of assessment of a vital need, the gravity of
a need is the severity of harm or suffering arising at all three levels of evaluation
(biological-functional, psychological and social) when the need is unmet.
As presented here, our theoretical proposal requires considerable further
development to be empirically serviceable. First, however, we bring our analysis
back to the work of Mooney. We have argued that health care need is a thick
15 Behind this, in the authors cited, there is an unmistakeable reference to an Aristotelian notion of
‘flourishing’.
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ethical concept; accordingly, the normative value that attaches to health care
needs draws from all three levels at which we argue thick concepts derive
their ethical import: the biological-functional, psychological and social. As noted
earlier (Mooney, 2010: 137), Mooney explicitly links our desire for good health
and our ability to judge good health to communal expectations. He is equally
explicit in defending the view that good healthmakes a fundamental contribution
to human well-being. Mooney’s new paradigm of active community setting of
health care priorities sees the legitimacy of community decisions as conferred by
solidarity on matters of shared importance; it is in this area that concepts of need
and, correlatively, harm and suffering, have their place. As a subspecies of vital
need, health care needs inherit the non-negotiability of the avoidance of harm.
At the same time, as a thick ethical concept, health care need rests on the three
levels identified as sources of value (the functional-biological, psychological and
social). Health care need thus has the flexibility to cope with the different socially
conditioned conceptions of harm and suffering, and expectations of well-being
of different communities. The impasse threateningMooney’s rejection on the one
hand of universal moral principles, including a universal conception of the com-
mon good, and on the other of a full-blown relativism can therefore be avoided.16
5. Conclusion
Our analysis builds an understanding of priority setting as the expression of local
conceptions of the common good. Since national and transnational policy debates
are embedded in overlapping frameworks of shared societal values, principles
of justice cannot be directly applied to the problems of priority setting (as extra
welfarism suggests). Human suffering and need, in particular, are irreducibly
social concepts that justify and underpin prioritisation policies. We have argued
that priority setting demands a conception of need which is related to the values
of a particular society, without being reducible to aggregated individual utilities.
In order to achieve this, we have employed Wiggins’s conception of vital need,
which we have suggested has the structure of a thick ethical concept whose
normative content comes from the human liability to suffer harm. What is
considered to be harmful is socially and psychologically articulated and cannot
be reduced to functional biological measures. This means that, as vital needs,
health care needs must be determined by a society’s members, according to the
conditions that obtain there.
The account of needs given here indicates avenues for empirical research into
the study of health care needs.17 From the perspective of social science research,
the focus should be on how the societal values embedded in the health system
16 It should also be obvious that this provides a way to deal with the problem of a ‘wicked’ community.
17 There is also scope for empirical investigation of the moral psychology of needing, and of suffering
and experiencing the consequences of harm.
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become implicated in the construction of health care needs (including cases
where one or more of Hasman et al.’s principles is operative). These constructed
needs can be interrogated for their implicit reliance on, or disregard of, the
concept of vital need outlined here. At the same time, the way that communities’
thick ethical concepts are expressed and negotiated at the individual and social
levels in people’s communications with each other, and with the institutions that
make and deliver health care policy can be investigated. This approach provides
empirical content to the idea canvassed earlier in connection with Wiggins’s
analysis that needs are negotiated between individuals and the system of social
morality. Such negotiation is a putting to the test of those institutions of society
which address the needs of its members. There is then a rich field for the empirical
study of such negotiations in, for example, the records of community bodies
and action groups concerned with health care, complaints procedures, legal
challenges, topics and causes ce´le`bres in the media and so forth. Harm and the
needs thatmust bemet to avoid it arematters aboutwhich people are rarely silent.
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